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Baxter: Baxter: Employees Beware

Employees Beware: Signing
Arbitration Agreements
May Limit Your Remedies in Suits
Filed by the EEOC
EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is used regularly to settle employment disputes, and federal policy
supports these agreements between private parties. Federal statutes, however, also
grant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the authority to pursue
employment discrimination claims in court. These claims do more than vindicate the
rights of individuals, they also safeguard the public interest in ending employment
discrimination. A conflict may arise between these two policies when employees
sign agreements to submit statutory discrimination claims to arbitration. This Note
examines the split of authority on the issue of whether the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission should be permitted to seek money damages on behalf of
individuals who have signed private arbitration agreements.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On June 23, 1994, Eric Baker applied for a job at a Waffle House restaurant in
Columbia, South Carolina.' The application he filled out included an arbitration
provision which stated that the applicant would submit to binding arbitration "any
dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment with Waffle House, Inc., or
any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or
benefits of such employment.",3 Baker was offered a job at that Waffle House, but
he declined. Instead, three weeks later, he called the manager of a nearby Waffle
House in West Columbia where he was hired to work as a grill operator.5
Baker suffered from a seizure disorder, which he developed after a car accident
in 1992.6 Two weeks after starting his new job he had a seizure at home.7 The
seizure was apparently triggered by a change in his medication.' On the following

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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day, he suffered another seizure at work. 9 He was fired on September 5, 1994.10 A
notice from Waffle House stated, "We decided that for [Baker's] benefit and safety
and Waffle House it would be best he not work any more."" Baker complained to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that his
discharge violated the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.12 In response, the
EEOC filed an enforcement action against Waffle House stating that Waffle House
had engaged in "unlawful employment practices at its West Columbia, South
Carolina, facility." 3 The EEOC sought:
(1) a permanent injunction barring Waffle House from engaging in
employment practices that discriminate on the basis of disability; (2) an
order that Waffle House institute and carry out anti-discrimination
policies, practices and programs to create opportunities and to eradicate
the effects of past and present discrimination on the basis of disability; (3)
backpay and reinstatement for Baker; (4) compensation for pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses suffered by Baker; and (5) punitive damages.14
Waffle House filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the litigation and,
in the alternative, to dismiss the action.' A magistrate judge recommended to the
district court that it find that Baker had entered into an arbitration agreement with
Waffle House, and that the EEOC must arbitrate the claims that were filed on behalf
of Baker.' 6 Instead, the district court denied Waffle House's motions." The court
found that Baker was not bound by the arbitration agreement because he was not
hired by the same restaurant where he filled out the application. 8
Waffle House appealed, arguing that a valid arbitration agreement existed
between the company and Baker. 9 In addition, Waffle House argued that the
arbitration
agreement bound the EEOC to "assert Baker's claim in an arbitral
,20
forum.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the employment application did
form a binding arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House; 21 that the
EEOC cannot be forced to arbitrate its claims due to an arbitration agreement
between the charging party and their employer, but the EEOC is prevented from
seeking "make-whole" relief, such as backpay and reinstatement, in a judicial forum
on behalf of an individual subject to an arbitration agreement.22

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 807-08.
15. Id. at 808.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 809.
22. Id. at 807.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, commonly known
as the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").23 Historically, arbitration was reserved for
24
commercial disputes where contract rights and remedies were at issue. In fact, the
Supreme Court initially held that the FAA could not be used to compel arbitration
of statutory or public law claims.25 At the same time, the court expressed a "f-m
26
preference" for arbitration as a means to resolve labor disputes. Until recently,
however, employers could not compel employees to agree to arbitrate statutory
28
discrimination claims.27 In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., the Supreme Court
held that an employee was entitled to pursue a discrimination claim in court, despite
denial of the claim by an arbitrator. 29 The Court stressed that an individual in a Title
VII case vindicates the public interest against employment discrimination, along with
his or her individual interests.30
There is a tension between the policy of enforcing private arbitration agreements
3
and the policy of shielding employees from discrimination in the workforce. The
2
FAA, according to one jurist, is a statute that promotes individualism. It serves the
public interest by allowing parties to adopt alternatives to litigation that they believe
33
Statutes that
will "cut red tape, take less time, and save litigation expense."
34
prohibit discrimination in the workplace, however, promote collectivist interests.
They are less concerned with economic efficiency and stand for the proposition that
state interests sometimes override individual choices.35
Put another way, Congress has determined that certain rights and obligations
should not be bargained for solely between the parties.36 The public interest in these
"basic" rights requires some degree of involvement by the government, and the
legislature protects these rights by enacting public laws.37 These rights "cannot be
abrogated by members of the general public, but are rights that inhere through the
relationship between government and citizens."3 Statutes prohibiting employment

23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
24. William H. Daughtrey, Jr., & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial
ArbitrationLaw to Statutory Rights Against Discriminationin Employment: A Discussionand Proposals
for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29, 48 (1998).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 48-49.
27. Robert N. Covington, Emp. ArbitrationAfter Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United
States?. 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 345, 346 (1998).
28. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
29. Covington, supra note 27, at 346.
30. Id. at 347.
31. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 470 (6th Cir. 1999) (Nelson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1998)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Daughtrey and Kidd, supra note 24, at 43.
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. Id. at 44.
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discrimination are one important category of such laws.39 While the employment-atwill doctrine generally gives employers a great amount of freedom in conducting
business, Congress has enacted several statutes to protect employees from unjust
discrimination in the workplace.4 In prohibiting employers from discriminating on
the basis of "age, gender, race,
ethnicity, or disability," these statutes protect an
"elementary public interest., 41
Because of the public interest at stake in employment discrimination claims,
Congress has given the EEOC independent authority to enforce anti-discrimination
laws. In order to understand the scope of the EEOC's authority to pursue claims of
disability-based discrimination, it is important to study the evolution of Title VII
because Congress incorporated the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII into the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 42 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created
the EEOC to investigate charges of employment discrimination.43 Under the original
statute, the EEOC was only authorized to investigate charges of employment
discrimination and to use informal conciliation to try to resolve such disputes." If
those methods failed, the EEOC's involvement in the case would end, and it was up
to the charging party to sue in federal court within 30 days of receiving notice from
the EEOC.45
In 1972, Congress realized that the voluntary approach to ending workplace
racial discrimination was not working. 46 "[F]ailure to grant the EEOC meaningful
47
enforcement powers [had] proven to be a major flaw in the operation of Title VII.
Stronger enforcement procedures were needed to put some teeth in the Civil Rights
Act and allow the EEOC to more effectively protect employees from
discrimination.4" Congress amended Title VII, granting the EEOC the power to file
suit in federal court under its own name.49 Title VII, and by incorporation the ADA,
requires an individual to file a charge with the EEOC for evaluation.5 ° The EEOC
will then evaluate the claim and either determine that the claim has no merit or grant
the employee a letter to sue or file an action itself.5 If the EEOC decides the claim
has merit but chooses not to sue, it will issue the individual a "notice of right to

39. Id.
40. Id. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (prohibiting
age discrimination); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 111996)
and 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on certain disabilities); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1994) (prohibiting race and gender
discrimination).
41. Daughtrey and Kidd, supra note 24, at 44.
42. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4, 5, 6, 8, 9)).
43. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 456.
44. Id. "
45. Id. at 457.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-415, at 4 (1971)).
48. Id.
49. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809.
50. Daughtrey and Kidd, supra note 24, at 46.
51. Id. at 46-47.
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a letter from
sue. ' 2 A party may not sue under Title VII if they do not receive such
4
the EEOC.53 The EEOC has 180 days to make its determination.
The policy clash between federal arbitration law and anti-discrimination statutes
took a new turn in 1991. The United States Supreme Court held in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that an arbitration agreement in a securities
registration application was enforceable where the clause required arbitration of
statutory claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")."5 In
Gilmer, the employee filed a lawsuit in federal court after first filing an age
discrimination complaint with the EEOC. 6 The Court reasoned that the burden was
on Gilmer to show that Congress "intended to preclude a waiver of
5 7a judicial forum
for ADEA claims," and Gilmer was unable to meet that burden.
The Court stated that arbitration does not interfere with the role of the EEOC in
enforcing ADEA claims, because employees who have signed arbitration agreements
"will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not
able to institute a private judicial action. 58 Gilmer also argued that arbitration is not
an adequate procedure to serve the policies of the ADEA because it does not provide
for broad equitable relief.59 In response, the Court stated that enforcing such
arbitration agreements between private parties did not "preclude the EEOC from
The Court did not
bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief."'
explicitly address the issue of money damages.6'
The Second Circuit relied on the reasoning in Gilmer when it held in EEOC v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co.62 that the EEOC was limited to pursuing injunctive relief in
court, while the employees in the case must abide by an arbitration agreement and
submit their individual claims to arbitration. 63 In Kidder,Peabody,the EEOC sought
money damages for nine employees who allegedly suffered discrimination on the
basis of their age.' While the EEOC had originally sought injunctive relief, the
business in question had discontinued investment banking, so the EEOC dropped its
claim for an injunction and sought only money damages.65 In a case of first
impression, the court reasoned that to allow the EEOC to seek money damages for
individuals who have "freely agreed to arbitrate all employment claims" would be
the equivalent of allowing employees to "make an end run around the arbitration
agreement." 66

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 456.
Id.
Id.
500 U.S. 20,35 (1991).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
Id.at 28.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303.
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The court acknowledged that while the EEOC's right of action is independent
from an individual employee's right of action, circuit courts have consistently held
that the EEOC may not seek money damages on behalf of employees who have
"waived, settled, or previously litigated the claim. ' 67 The court then took a closer
look at the enforcement scheme of the ADEA, which allows an individual to sue in
federal court but takes that right away if the EEOC decides to pursue the claim.6
The court concluded that since an individual is prohibited from suing in federal court
once the EEOC decides to pursue a case, Congress must have intended for the EEOC
to serve as the individual's representative. 69 Therefore, in EEOC v. United States
Steel Corp., the court held that the EEOC may not seek money damages on behalf
of an employee who had already unsuccessfully sued for damages, on grounds of res
judicata.70 The court reasoned that the EEOC acts as a representative for an
individual when it seeks monetary relief for an individual.7 The EEOC's role
differs, however, when it attempts to protect a "broader interest" by seeking
injunctive relief.72 When the EEOC pursues broad injunctive relief it is acting on
behalf of the public interest, not the individual, and courts have allowed the EEOC
to seek injunctive relief even where an employee has settled, waived or litigated the
claim.73 The EEOC, in seeking broad injunctive relief, protects the interests of the
"United States as sovereign" in ending employment discrimination. 4 When the
EEOC seeks backpay for an individual, however, the public interest is minimal."
The court adopted the reasoning of EEOCv. GoodyearAerospace Corp. and United
States Steel Corp. in concluding that the public interest is strongest when the EEOC
seeks broad injunctive relief and weakest when it seeks money damages on behalf
of an individual.76
In a later decision, the Sixth Circuit rejected the reasoning in Kidder, Peabody,
holding that the EEOC may seek monetary damages on behalf of employees who
have signed arbitration agreements.77 The difference in the outcome may be
attributed to the way in which the Sixth Circuit framed the issue. The court stated
that the precise issue was "whether a single employee may, by entering into a private
arbitration agreement with her employer, divest the EEOC of its authority to remedy
employment discrimination."7 The court stressed the legislative history behind the
amendments to Title VII and the dual enforcement scheme of the statute. 79 Title VII
allows recovery through private action or action by the EEOC, and it gives the
EEOC the power to decide which path to follow."0 An employee does not have the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 302 (citing EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Kidder. Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d at 301.
Id. at 302 (quoting EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990)).
EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d. 489, 496-97.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
Kidder,Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d at 302.
Id.
Id. (citing EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Id.
Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d 448,467 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 466.
Id.
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power to sue without authorization from the EEOC."' Therefore, "an individual
cannot.., override the power of the EEOC to sue in its own name" by signing an
arbitration agreement.8 2 The court saw no reason why the EEOC should be
precluded from seeking money damages for individuals who otherwise could submit
their claims for arbitration "just as it always has when suing on behalf of an
individual."83 The court added that limiting the EEOC to injunctive relief would
"severely impede its ability to protect the public interest.4 4 Monetary awards are
often a stronger incentive for employers to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices.8 5 In addition, the court noted that while Gilmer explicitly stated that
arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC from seeking class-wide and
equitable relief, the opinion is silent on the issue of money damages.86 The court
concluded that Gilmer should not be read to exclude the possibility of money
damages simply because it is silent on the issue.87
The above reading of Gilmer finds support from at least three commentators
who write that it is "spurious to assume that a class-wide action seeking equitable
relief represents the sole occasion upon which the EEOC may pursue a lawsuit on
behalf of employees who have signed an arbitration agreement." 8
These
commentators believe Gilmer should not be read to exclude the possibility of money
damages on behalf of employees who have signed arbitration agreements because
such a reading goes beyond the "plain language" of the court.89
A dissenting judge in Frank's Nursery wrote that the courts are operating
without clear guidance from Congress in trying to resolve the conflict between Title
VII and federal policy promoting arbitration. 90 In resolving the conflict "anything
approaching certitude... is impossible."'" Rather than create a split of authority, he
would follow the Second Circuit because, in his mind, the balance struck in Kidder,
Peabody,and followed by Waffle House, "makes sense. 92

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Waffle House, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a split of
authority on the issue of how an arbitration agreement between an employee and a
corporation affects a claim filed by the EEOC on behalf of the employee. 93 The

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 461.
87. Id.
88. David Sherwyn etal., J.Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration
of Employment Disputes:Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructinga New Sink
in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 117 (1999).
89. Id.
90. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 471.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 193 F.3d at 809.
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court rejected Waffle House's argument that the EEOC was bound by the arbitration
agreement to submit its claim to arbitration.94 Relying on the legislative history
behind Title VII (and by incorporation the ADA), the court held that the EEOC "has
independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue
is proper.""
In reaching its decision, the court focused on the dual system of private and
public enforcement created by amendments to Title VII.96 The clear intention of the
amendments was to place primary enforcement in the hands of the EEOC. 97 Unlike
the individual charging party, the EEOC serves a public mission when it acts to
enforce federal laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace. 9 Therefore, the
EEOC "does not act merely as a proxy for the charging party but rather seeks to
'advance the public interest in preventing and remedying employment
discrimination." '99 The EEOC sues to "[v]indicate the public interest as expressed
in the Congressional purpose of eliminating employment discrimination as a national
evil rather
than for the redress of the strictly private interests of the complaining
'1
party. 0"
The court found ample evidence in the Title VII enforcement scheme to support
the conclusion that the "EEOC and the charging party are not interchangeable
plaintiffs."' 0 ' The EEOC has the authority to choose to litigate the cases that it
believes most significantly affect the public interest.'0 2 A charging party is not
allowed to sue in federal court until the EEOC has made its own determination about
the merits of the claim and issued a right-to-sue letter.'0 3 If the EEOC chooses to file
suit, the individual is limited to intervening. " When a private person sues, the court
' 5
in certain cases may allow the EEOC to intervene to "protect the national interest.' 0
Given the dual enforcement system established by statute, the court treated the
interests of the EEOC and the charging party as independent in determining how an
arbitration signed by an individual should affect a claim by the EEOC.'06
The court noted that Title VII and the ADA do not require the EEOC to
arbitrate.'0 1 In addition, the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement
between Waffle House and Baker.'0 8 Citing Frank'sNursery and Kidder, Peabody,

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. See Joint Conference Committee, Section-by-Section Analysis, 118 CONG. REc. 3462 (Mar.
6, 1972) (stating that Congress hoped that the vast majority of cases would be handled by the EEOC or
Attorney General and that private lawsuits would be the exception); S. REP. No. 92-415, at 4 (1971).
(stating that Congress believed that the failure to grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement powers was
a major flaw in Title VII).
98. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809.
99. Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)).
100. Id. at 809-10. (citing EEOC v. General Elec. Co. 532 F.2d 559, 373 (4th Cir. 1976)).
101. Id. at 811.
102. Id. at 810.
103. Id. (quoting Davis v. North Carolina Dep't. of Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 138 (4thCir. 1995)).
104. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1994)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 811.
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the court stated that neither of the circuits that have addressed the issue have
concluded that such arbitration agreements permit courts to "force the EEOC into
arbitration under the FAA."' 9 The court also noted that the Supreme Court in
Gilmer recognized that the EEOC, when acting in its "public role," is not bound by
arbitration agreements signed by private parties."' The court noted that unlike a
private action, a suit filed by the EEOC can combat "discrimination on a societal
level.'
Also, the court emphasized an assertion by the Gilmer court that arbitration
agreements "will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide
and equitable relief.""' 2 Therefore, the court held that the EEOC could not be
compelled to arbitrate its claim against Waffle House." 3
The court then noted that it is important to balance the EEOC's public role of
ending employment discrimination with the federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." 4 Allowing the EEOC to pursue Baker's individual claim would
"significantly trample this strong policy favoring arbitration.""' 5 In balancing these
competing policies, the court adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Kidder,
Peabody, which held that the EEOC may seek injunctive relief in federal court for
employees even when they have entered into arbitration agreements."16 However,
the EEOC may not seek purely monetary relief for such employees.' The court
reasoned that when the EEOC seeks monetary relief for an individual, the public
interest is minimal because the agency is suing primarily for the benefit of the
charging party, and, therefore, the pro-arbitration goals of the FAA outweigh the
EEOC's right to sue in court." 8 Only a more important policy would justify
allowing the EEOC to pursue claims that the employee is barred from pursuing in
court." 9 The EEOC's goal of eliminating employment discrimination "may be such
a policy in certain contexts .... ."120 The court then concluded that the public interest
the EEOC seeks to vindicate is highest when it is seeking "large-scale injunctive
relief' and lowest when it is only seeking enforcement of an individual's claim.'
When the EEOC seeks broad injunctive relief, the public interest is greater and so
the policy of allowing the EEOC to sue in federal court to eradicate workplace
22
discrimination outweighs the federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.
The court went on to hold that the EEOC was permitted to seek a "permanent
injunction enjoining [Waffle House] from discharging individuals and engaging in
any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of disability" and
an order compelling Waffle House "to institute and carry out policies ... which

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities,
and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment
practices."' ' At the same time, the court held24that the EEOC cannot sue in federal
court to seek individual remedies for Baker.1

V. COMMENT
The Fourth Circuit struck a fair balance in Waffle House between the competing
policies of upholding private arbitration agreements and preserving the EEOC's
power to end employment discrimination. In striking this compromise, the court
rejected Waffle House's argument that the EEOC must submit its claims to
arbitration if the individual alleging discrimination has signed an arbitration
agreement. 12' At the same time, the court refused to allow the EEOC to seek money
damages on behalf of employees who have agreed to submit employment disputes
to court. 2 6 In reaching its decision, the court followed the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Kidder,Peabody,2 7 which was inspired by the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Gilmer.'28
Two policies are at stake in Waffle House: the federal policy of enforcing
arbitration agreements and the goal of the EEOC to eliminate employment
discrimination. The conflict is in reaching a fair comprohaise that does not
undermine the goals of either policy. A driving force behind the court's holding in
Waffle House was its characterization of the EEOC's role as one of serving the
"public interest" when it seeks to prevent employment discrimination. 29 From there,
the court proceeded to identify those claims where the public interest was most
significant - when the EEOC is seeking broad, injunctive relief- in an effort to
determine when to tip the scales in favor of the EEOC. 30 There is nothing unique
about this characterization. Other courts have already held that when an employee
waives, settles, or litigates a claim, the EEOC is limited to seeking injunctive
relief.3 Therefore, the idea that an individual may limit the scope of relief that the
EEOC may seek on her behalf, by settling or agreeing to waive a claim, is nothing
new.
The Sixth Circuit believes this compromise undercuts the ability of the EEOC
to guard the public interest against employment discrimination because injunctive
orders are not a strong enough incentive to make employers avoid discriminatory
practices.' The threat of a backpay award is what provides the motivation for many

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 809.
126. Id. at 812.
127. 156 F.3d 298.
128. 500 U.S. 20.
129. 193 F.3d at 812.
130. Id.
131. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d at 302.
132. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 466 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975)).
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employers to avoid discrimination.'33 The court found support for its view in the
13 4
amendments to Title VII, which gave the EEOC power to sue in federal court.
The court found further support for its holding in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which afforded the EEOC the remedies of compensatory and punitive damages.'
"If Congress believed the EEOC could effectively eradicate employment
discrimination through injunctive remedies alone, it would not have empowered the
EEOC to obtain more."' 36 The threat of a monetary penalty may, in fact, be a more
effective deterrent to employment discrimination. An employee is still free,
however, to seek monetary awards through arbitration. Once an employee has
agreed to submit her claims to an arbitrator, however, it would undermine the
agreement if the EEOC could then turn around and sue on her behalf for those very
same claims.
Under the enforcement scheme of Title VII, it is the EEOC, and not the
individual, who has the power to decide whether the EEOC will sue or whether it
will be left to the individual to pursue the claim.'37 The Sixth Circuit appears to be
concerned about giving individuals the right to sign agreements that trump the ability
of the EEOC to sue in its own name. However, the holding in Waffle House does not
take away the power of the EEOC to sue in its own name, it simply controls the
remedy it may seek in court in those cases where an employee has signed a private
arbitration agreement. The EEOC still retains the power to seek broad injunctive
relief, and the court in Waffle House made it very clear that it recognized the
independent authority of the EEOC to sue, regardless of the action taken by
individuals. It is true that the holding in Waffle House limits the scope of the
EEOC's action in cases where employees have signed arbitration agreements. The
alternative, however, would be to give the EEOC the power to trump private
arbitration agreements in cases where it decides to pursue money damages in court
on behalf of employees who have already signed contracts stating they will submit
their claims to arbitration. Such a policy would tip the scales completely in favor of
the EEOC at the expense of federal policies favoring private arbitration agreements.
The compromise in Waffle House does a better job of protecting both interests
without allowing one policy to overshadow the other.
One final sticking point between the Waffle House/Kidder, Peabody courts and
the Frank'sNursery court is their contrary interpretations of Gilmer. The court in
Frank'sNursery reads Gilmer more narrowly, stating that while the Gilmer Court is
silent on the issue of money damages, there is no reason to believe the Court meant
to preclude the EEOC from seeking money damages on behalf of employees who
sign arbitration agreements. 3 ' This may be true, but such a reading of Gilmer
involves as much guesswork as does a broader reading. The fact is, the Gilmer Court
simply did not address the issue. Therefore, it is unfair to imply that the Waffle
House court based its holding entirely on a broader reading of Gilmer. Because of
this gap in the law, the court turned to other sources, including the Kidder, Peabody
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and Frank's Nursery decisions,
legislative history, and the policy issues at stake,
39
before reaching its holding.
At least two judges have asked for guidance from Congress on the issue of
40
balancing the policies behind the FAA and employment discrimination laws.'
Judge Feinberg gave unenthusiastic support for the Kidder, Peabody decision,
concluding that the majority did not apply the law incorrectly, but adding that the
law is unclear and needs to be re-examined.1 4' Given the lack of guidance the courts
have received from Congress in this area, the Waffle House court has done an
adequate job of trying to strike a fair compromise. The arguments raised by Frank's
Nursery, however, also have merit. Until Congress provides judges with more
direction in this area, courts will be left to search for clues in legislative history, dicta
and policy arguments. Using those sources, judges can find support for either side
of this argument. Without clear guidance from Congress, this new split of authority
will continue to confound this already complex area of the law, leaving the door
open for judges to choose whichever policy argument they agree with most.

VI. CONCLUSION
Finding a common ground between federal policies aimed at protecting private
arbitration agreements and the more collectivist goals of anti-discrimination laws is
not an easy task. The Waffle House court, in choosing to follow Kidder, Peabody,
has adopted a balancing test that preserves both policies. The public interest is
greater when the EEOC is seeking broad injunctive relief than when it is simply
seeking money damages on behalf of one individual. Allowing the EEOC to pursue
injunctive relief, but not money damages, in cases where employees have signed
arbitration agreements does little to compromise the anti-discrimination goals of
federal statutes and also protects private arbitration agreements. The Frank's
Nursery court raises a good argument in taking the position that the EEOC should
not be limited by an individual's private arbitration agreement in deciding which
remedies to seek. Without clear direction from Congress, however, the Waffle House
court does a better job of balancing all the interests at stake.
SARAH BAXTER

139. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812.
140. See Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d 448,471 (Nelson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (Feinberg, J. concurring).
141. 156 F.3d at 304.
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